

FILED  
Court of Appeals  
Division III  
State of Washington  
2/24/2023 9:33 AM

FILED  
SUPREME COURT  
STATE OF WASHINGTON  
2/24/2023  
BY ERIN L. LENNON  
CLERK

101747-2

NO. 38533-7-III

COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION III

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**STATE OF WASHINGTON,**

Plaintiff/Respondent,

V.

**LLOYD EDWIN HERNDON II**

Defendant/Appellant.

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**PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW**

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**1. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER**

Lloyd Edwin Herndon II requests the relief designated in Part 2 of this Petition.

**2. STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT**

Mr. Herndon seeks review of an Unpublished Opinion of Division III of the Court of Appeals dated February 2, 2023. (Appendix “A” 1-17)

**3. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW**

Does a defendant who pleads guilty to an offense need to file a motion to withdraw his/her guilty plea (CrR 4.2 (f)), prior to appealing the conviction, when there are insufficient facts to support the plea?

**4. STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

Lloyd Edwin Herndon II was charged with second degree assault-DV pursuant to an Information filed on June 3, 2021. (CP 7; Appendix “B”)

The Information was based upon an affidavit of probable cause which was filed on June 2, 2021. The affidavit states, in part:

Herndon struck her several times with a closed fist while she was in the driver's seat and he was outside the vehicle. Herndon entered the vehicle and placed his hands around her neck and squeezed. [R.H.] said she was unable to breathe when Herndon had his hands around her neck. [R.H.] said this happened two times.

... I observed red abrasions on both sides of [R.H.'s] neck. There was a lump forming under her hair where she was struck by Herndon.

(CP 1, Appendix "C")

The Information referenced RCW 9A.36.021 (1)(e) in the caption. The charging portion of the Information cited RCW 9A.36.021 (1)(c). The factual outline, as contained in the probable cause affidavit, supports a violation of RCW 9A.36.021 (1)(g).

Mr. Herndon plead guilty to second degree assault-DV based upon an intent to commit “felony theft.” Paragraph 11 of his guilty plea statement reads as follows:

On June 1, 2021, in Adams County, Washington, while I intended to commit a felony theft, I assaulted a family or household member.

(CP 61)

The trial court conducted a colloquy with Mr. Herndon at the time that he entered his plea. The pertinent part of the colloquy states:

THE COURT: Mr. Herndon, what is your plea, guilty or not guilty, to the charge of assault in the second degree with domestic violence?

MR. HERNDON: Guilty.

THE COURT: Do you make said plea freely and voluntarily?

MR. HERNDON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: At paragraph eleven there is a statement. It reads as follows: On June 1, 2021, in Adams County, Washington, while I intended to commit a felony theft, I assaulted a family or household member. Is that your statement, sir?

MR. HERNDON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is it a true statement?

MR. HERNDON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I find the defendant's plea of guilty to be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. He understands the charge, the consequences of his plea. There is a factual basis for his plea. I find him guilty as charged. Sentencing date?



The Court of Appeals determined that Mr. Herndon's guilty plea was valid and that he should have filed a motion to withdraw the plea.

**5. ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED**

*QUERY:* Did the State intend to charge Mr. Herndon with subparagraph (c), (e), or (g) of RCW 9A.36.021 (1)?

Mr. Herndon challenges the sufficiency of the underlying facts to support his guilty plea.

There are no facts set out in any portion of the record to indicate that Mr. Herndon was armed with a deadly weapon.

There are no facts set out any place in the record to indicate that Mr. Herndon intended to commit a "felony theft" with the exception of the guilty plea statement itself.

The only underlying facts contained in any of the documentation that would support a plea to second degree assault DV pertain to subparagraph (g). Those facts are set out in the probable cause affidavit.

“Due process requires that a defendant be apprised of the nature of the offense in order for a guilty plea to be accepted as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Real notice of the nature of the charge is “the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process.” *Henderson v. Morgan*, 426 U.S. 637, 645, 49 L. Ed. 108, 96 S. Ct. 2253 (1976) (quoting *Smith v. O’Grady*, 312 U.S. 329, 334, 85 L. Ed. 859, 61 S. Ct. 572 (1941)). *Accord, in re Keene*, 95 Wn.2d 203, 622 P.2d 360 (1980). At a minimum, the defendant would need to be aware of the acts and the requisite state of mind in which they must be performed to constitute a crime.” 95 Wn.2d at 207 (quoting *State v. Holsworth*, 93 Wn.2d 148, 153 n.3, 607 P.2d 845 (1980)). *Accord, State v. Chervenell*, 99 Wn.2d 309, 318, 662 P.2d 836 (1983).

*State v. Osborne*, 102 Wn.2d 87, 92-93, 684 P.2d 683 (1984).

In the absence of a factual basis his constitutional right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Const. art. I, §§ 3 and 22 was denied.

The Court of Appeals found that Mr. Herndon failed to demonstrate the absence of a factual basis. The Court of Appeals is in error.

RAP 13.4 (b) provides, in part:

A petition for review will be accepted by the Supreme Court only: (1) If the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court; or (2) If the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with a published decision of the Court of Appeals; or (3) If a significant question of law under the Constitution of the State of Washington or of the United States is involved; or ....

Mr. Herndon contends that the lack of a factual basis for his guilty plea falls within the provisions of RAP 13.4 (b)(1), (2) and (3).

As announced in *State v. Nonog*, 169 Wn.2d 220, 226, 237 P.3d 250 (2010): “More than merely listing the elements, the information must allege the particular facts supporting them.”

The Information in Mr. Herndon’s case does not set out any specific facts to support a plea of guilty to RCW 9A.36.021 (1)(c). The Court of Appeals determined that Mr. Herndon’s affirmation of his statement in the guilty plea satisfied the requirement that a sufficient factual basis must be present to support a plea. Again, the Court of Appeals is in error.

A factual basis exists if there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude the defendant is guilty. *State v. Newton*, 87 Wn.2d 363, 370, 552 P.2d 682 (1976). The factual basis “may come from any source the trial court finds reliable, and not just the admissions of the defendant,” *Newton*, 87 Wn.3d at 370 “so long as the material relied upon the trial court is made a part of the record.”

*Personal Restraint of Fuamaila*, 131 Wn. App. 908, 924, 131 P.3d 318 (2006) quoting *State v. Osborne*, 102 Wn.2d 87, 95, 684 P.2d 683 (1984).

The record reflects that Mr. Herndon’s statement is the only basis upon which the sentencing court relied.

“Essential elements include facts that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to convict a defendant of a charged crime.” *State v. Melland*, 9 Wn. App. 2d 786, 811, 450 P.3d 562 (2019); *see also: State v. Zillyette*, 175 Wn.2d 153, 158, 307 P.3d 712 (2013); and *State v. Sullivan*, 196 Wn. App. 314, 319, 382 P.3d 786 (2016).

The Court of Appeals decision also relies upon the colloquy that was conducted between the trial court and Mr. Herndon. The colloquy does not cure the defect.

During the colloquy between the trial judge and defendant, no attempt was made to orally elicit a description of either defendant’s acts or state of mind which resulted in the charge to which he ultimately pleaded guilty... Because that statement is a mere conclusion of law, and, more importantly, fails to set forth any of the elements which a jury could have found a defendant guilty... we hold that it falls short of fulfilling the factual basis requirement of CrR 4.2 (d).

*State v. Powell*, 29 Wn. App. 163, 167, 627 P.2d 1337 (1981).

The Court of Appeals position is that Mr. Herndon was required to comply with CrR 4.2 (f) before he could appeal the question of the sufficiency of the underlying factual basis of the plea.

CrR 4.2 (f) states:

**Withdrawal of Plea.** The court shall allow a defendant to withdraw the defendant's plea of guilty whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice....

There is nothing in the rule that requires that a defendant who has pled guilty must comply with this subparagraph before challenging the sufficiency of the factual basis for a plea.

Accused persons have a constitutional right to know the charges against them. **U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI; WASH. CONST.** art. I, § 22 “Pursuant to this right, ‘[t]he accused ... has a constitutional right to be apprised of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.... This doctrine is elementary and of universal application, and is founded on the plainest principle of justice.’” *State v. Gehrke*, 193 Wn.2d 1, 6, 434 P.3d 522 (2019) (lead opinion) (first and third

alternations in original) (quoting *State v. Ackles*, 8 Wash. 462, 464-65, 36 P. 597 (1894)). The State gives notice of charges by Information, which “shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” CrR 2.1 (a)(1).

*State v. Pry*, 194 Wn.2d 745, 751, 452 P.3d 536 (2019).

The Court of Appeals decision also seems to imply that Mr. Herndon’s prior criminal history, which involved convictions for both second and fourth degree assault, somehow fulfills the requirement of a factual basis in the present case. Mr. Herndon has located no authority to support this aspect of the decision.

In fact, the *Pry* case went on to state at 761-62:

“...[T]he inadequacy of the information cannot be cured by referring to the certificate of probable cause... [W]e do not treat certificates of probable cause as part of the information, even when they are attached to or accompany the information

*QUERY:* Where are the facts to support an alleged felony theft?

WPIC 35.11 sets out the instruction for second degree assault with intent to commit a felony. It requires that a jury be advised of the name of the felony that a defendant intended to commit. (Appendix “D”)

WPIC 35.16 specifically tells a jury that the felony which a defendant intended to commit is an element of the offense. (Appendix “E”)

The only case which Mr. Herndon has been able to locate in connection with an offense under RCW 9A.36.021 (1)(c) is *State v. Costello*, 29 Wash. 366 (1902). The *Costello* Court, in discussing the particular subsection, stated at 373:

The information charges the defendant with the crime of “assault with intent to commit a felony.” The particular felony is not named in that part of the information, but, immediately following, the facts are stated which show the felony to be robbery. The defendant could not have been misled as to the particular felony which was clearly charged against him.



Mr. Herndon's case is substantially different since there are no factual predicates to support his plea to second degree assault-DV by means of intent to commit a felony theft.

## **6. CONCLUSION**

Mr. Herndon satisfies the requirements of RAP 13.4 (b)(1) by submitting that the Court of Appeals decision violates *State v. Osborne, supra*; *State v. Nonog, supra*; *State v. Pry, supra*; and *State v. Costello, supra*.

Mr. Herndon submits that the Court of Appeals decision is also adverse to the decisions in *Personal Restraint of Fuamaila, supra*; *State v. Melland, supra*; and *State v. Powell, supra* as proscribed by RAP 13.4 (b)(2).

Mr. Herndon also submits that the provisions of RAP 13.4 (b)(3) are met due to violation of his constitutional right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Const. art. I, §§ 3 and 22.

The Court of Appeals decision should be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for dismissal.

Certificate of Compliance: I hereby certify there are 1999 words contained in this Petition For Discretionary Review.

DATED this 24th day of February, 2023.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Dennis W. Morgan

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## APPENDIX “A”

**FILED**  
**FEBRUARY 2, 2023**  
In the Office of the Clerk of Court  
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON  
DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,	)	
	)	
Respondent,	)	No. 38533-7-III
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
LLOYD EDWIN HERNDON, II,	)	UNPUBLISHED OPINION
	)	
Appellant.	)	

SODDOWAY, C.J. — Lloyd Herndon appeals his conviction for assault in the second degree—domestic violence, which followed his plea of guilty to that charge. For the first time on appeal, he contends the trial court was not presented with a factual basis for his plea as required by CrR 4.2(d), a rule violation that he argues deprived him of due process. In a pro se statement of additional grounds (SAG), he contends that in entering the plea, he relied on information that the victim had agreed to a mental health sentencing alternative the State had agreed to recommend at sentencing. At sentencing, however, the victim objected to the sentencing alternative and the court declined to impose it.

Mr. Herndon’s brief fails to demonstrate that a factual basis for his plea was lacking. While the issue raised in his SAG identifies a mistake that could arguably make his guilty plea involuntary, controlling case law holds that he waived a right to withdraw his plea by not requesting that remedy upon learning of the misunderstanding.

We affirm.

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### FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In June 2021, the State charged Mr. Herndon with one count of assault in the second degree—domestic violence. The information, in its caption, identifies RCW 9A.36.021(1)(e) as the basis for the assault charge. RCW 9A.36.021(1)(e) applies to assault “[w]ith intent to commit a felony.”

The body of the information alleged that “[o]n or about the 1st day of June, 2021, in the County of Adams, State of Washington, the above-named Defendant, *with intent to commit a felony, did assault another person, to-wit . . .*” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 7 (emphasis added). In apparent error, it continued, “contrary to Revised Code of Washington 9A.36.021(1)(c).” *Id.* (emphasis added). RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c) applies to “[a]ssault[ing] another with a deadly weapon.” There is no evidence the defense ever noted or questioned this inconsistency in the trial court.

In the fall of 2021, the parties reached a plea agreement. In their written agreement, Mr. Herndon agreed to plead guilty “[a]s charged in Count 1 of the . . . original . . . information,” with a special finding of domestic violence. CP at 47. The prosecutor agreed to recommend that the court impose a then-recently enacted mental health sentencing alternative codified at RCW 9.94A.695.

The parties stipulated that the real and material facts for the purpose of sentencing were those set forth Mr. Herndon's statement of defendant on plea of guilty. Mr.

Herndon provided the following facts in that statement:

11. The judge has asked me to state what I did in my own words that makes me guilty of this crime, including enhancements and domestic violence relationships, if they apply. This is my statement:  
On June 1, 2021, in Adams County, Washington, while I intended to commit a felony theft, I assaulted a family or household member.

CP at 61.

At the hearing on whether to accept the guilty plea, the prosecutor told the court that the resolution reached was unique in the sense that Mr. Herndon would be asking to be sentenced under the new mental health sentencing alternative. He said that personnel of his office had spoken to the victim, who "is on board with this resolution." Report of Proceedings (RP) at 19. The prosecutor expressed his own view that "this is a good alternative in this case." *Id.*

The court's questioning of Mr. Herndon before accepting his guilty plea included the following:

THE COURT: Mr. Herndon, I have two documents, both of which appear to bear your signature. A Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty and a Felony Plea Agreement. Did you read both of these documents over with your attorney? And did you understand them?

MR. HERNDON: Yes, Your Honor.

....

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THE COURT: Mr. Herndon, what is your plea, guilty or not guilty, to the charge of assault in the second degree with domestic violence?

MR. HERNDON: Guilty.

THE COURT: Do you make said plea freely and voluntarily?

MR. HERNDON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: At [p]aragraph eleven there is a statement. It reads as follows: On June 1, 2021, in Adams County, Washington, while I intended to commit a felony theft, I assaulted a family or household member. Is that your statement, sir?

MR. HERNDON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is it a true statement?

MR. HERNDON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I find the defendant's plea of guilty to be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. He understands the charge, the consequences of his plea. There is a factual basis for his plea. I find him guilty as charged.

RP at 20-21.

Mr. Herndon was sentenced a week later. As agreed, the prosecutor recommended that the court impose the mental health sentencing alternative, at the same time acknowledging that the evaluation by the Department of Corrections was "a little ambivalent on their support." RP at 25. In concluding his oral recommendation, the prosecutor stated, "When we entered this the [sic] victim was on board. It was my understanding, expressed to me [by] our victim advocate at the time, that she was on board. So, we've reached this resolution." RP at 25-26. The prosecutor added that the victim was present, however, and wished to address the court.

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invited to speak by the court, the victim related that she had been in a relationship with Mr. Herndon for three years and felt she “became a victim to his mental and physical abuse” during that time. RP at 26. She stated that the charged offense was not Mr. Herndon’s first assault and spoke at some length about the violence Mr. Herndon exhibited during their relationship. She said, “I ask, I beg of you, to not allow this man to get a lower sentence but the maximum time you can give him. He is a monster who deserves to be punished for every time he has broken a woman or a home.” RP at 28.

When she finished, the court sought clarification on whether she had supported the proposed sentencing alternative:

THE COURT: Madam, you just asked me to sentence this man to the maximum I could sentence him to. The prosecutor just told me that you are in favor, or expressed that you were in favor of the mental health treatment option.

[VICTIM]: I was not.

THE COURT: Are you not?

[VICTIM]: I was not and I told him that today when I came in. He said it was a miscommunication between his old person that was in there and me. Now, I was never in agreement for him to get this.

THE COURT: I understand. Thank you, madam.

RP at 29.

Defense counsel addressed the court next and repeated the prosecutor’s report that the victim’s advocate told the parties that the victim was in support of the sentencing alternative. Notwithstanding the victim’s announced position, defense counsel argued at



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length that Mr. Herndon was a good candidate for the sentencing alternative, characterizing his client as receptive to counseling and medication to treat his mental diagnoses, and as demonstrating accountability by entering a guilty plea.

When Mr. Herndon was invited to speak, he expressed shame and remorse for his actions, stated that his mental health had played a role, and requested the sentencing alternative.

In announcing its sentence, the court began by addressing the victim's position:

Ordinarily I am very, very willing to consider treatment alternatives. In this case, the statute specifically says that the Court shall consider the victim's opinion whether the defendant should receive a sentence under this section. To me that highlights the victim's opinion as a factor in the Court's consideration and the Legislature must have added that special language for a reason.

I do not believe that either attorney in this case misrepresented the victim's opinion and I don't fault either attorney in this case. But the victim testified that her primary fear is that he will come back to harm her. That is justifiable because his criminal history includes two protection order violations, both felonies.

RP at 38-39. Rather than impose the sentencing alternative, the court imposed a midpoint sentence of 50 months' confinement.

Mr. Herndon appeals.

#### ANALYSIS

Mr. Herndon's brief assigns error to the trial court's acceptance of a guilty plea that "does not comply with the requirements of CrR 4.2(d) and contravenes the due

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process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Const. art. I, §§ 3 and 22.” Br. of Appellant at 1. Yet the only issue he identifies in his opening brief is whether a sufficient factual foundation was provided for the guilty plea and, if not, whether his conviction should be vacated. Elsewhere, he states that the issue is whether, “in the absence of the factual predicates necessary to substantiate the charge[, the plea] is invalid.” *Id.* at 9. He supports his contention that the court was not presented with a factual basis for the plea with two arguments: first, that “the Information charges an erroneous subparagraph of RCW 9A.36.021,” and second, that Mr. Herndon’s statement of the facts that made him guilty “amounts to nothing other than an admission to fourth degree assault.” Br. of Appellant at 10. Significantly, Mr. Herndon does not contend in his brief that the trial court accepted a plea that was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

The State’s threshold response to the “no factual basis” challenge is that it is a nonconstitutional challenge being made for the first time on appeal, and we should apply RAP 2.5(a) and decline to review it. The State also contests the two bases on which a factual basis was allegedly lacking.

Mr. Herndon replies that the error assigned has constitutional implications and can be raised for the first time on appeal under either RAP 2.5(a)(2) or (3).

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The State's issue preservation challenge is well-taken, but it is sometimes more expeditious to dispense with an alleged error on its merits than to analyze an appellant's arguments under RAP 2.5(a)(2) and (3). It is more expeditious to reject Mr. Herndon's claim of error on the merits here.

1. The information's inconsistent references to two subsections of RCW 9A.36.021 does not prevent Mr. Herndon's guilty plea statement from serving as a factual basis for his plea

CrR 4.2(d) requires that "[t]he court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea." The rule's requirement protects defendants who are in the position of voluntarily pleading guilty with an understanding of the nature of the charge, but who do not realize that their conduct does not actually fall within the charge. *In re Pers. Restraint of Crabtree*, 141 Wn.2d 577, 585, 9 P.3d 814 (2000).

Among means by which an individual can commit second degree assault are (under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first degree) either "[a]ssault[ing] another with a deadly weapon," which is made criminal by RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c), or, "[w]ith intent to commit a felony, assault[ing] another," which is made criminal by RCW 9A.36.021(1)(e). As recounted above, the information filed against Mr. Herndon cited subsection (e) of the statute in its caption and the body of the information alleged that "the above-named Defendant, with intent to ~~commit~~<sup>25</sup> commit a felony, did assault another

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person,” but that sentence continued, inconsistently, “contrary to Revised Code of Washington 9A.36.021(1)(c).” CP at 7 (emphasis added).

Mr. Herndon’s statement of plea on guilty described the crime to which he was pleading guilty as only “Assault in the Second Degree—Domestic Violence.” CP at 51. It stated that the crime’s elements were “as contained in the Information.” *Id.* Mr. Herndon’s handwritten explanation of what made him guilty was that, on the date and place charged, “while I intended to commit a felony theft, I assaulted a family or household member.” CP at 61.

Given that the statement on plea of guilty identifies the crime generically as “Assault in the Second Degree,” we can see where Mr. Herndon’s explanation of what made him guilty would provide an insufficient factual basis if he was charged and convicted of a means of second degree assault *other than* RCW 9A.36.021(1)(e). But the information before the court when it accepted the plea was overwhelmingly that he was pleading guilty to a violation of RCW 9A.36.021(1)(e).

While the State acknowledges a citation error in the information, it points out that this single error is offset not only by the correct statutory citation in the caption but more importantly, by the consistent description of the offense as being an assault “with intent to commit a felony” in (1) the information, (2) Mr. Herndon’s statement of the real and material facts in the statement on plea of guilty, and (3) the colloquy with the

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court when accepting the plea. See RP at 21. Mr. Herndon's judgment and sentence entered a week later was also consistent, convicting him of second degree assault under RCW 9A.36.021(1)(e).

Notably, Mr. Herndon does not challenge the sufficiency of the charging document. If he had, what is required is a plain, concise and definite written statement of the *essential facts* constituting the offense charged. CrR 2.1(a)(1). While the information must state the official or customary citation of the statute the defendant is alleged to have violated, error in the citation or its omission is not ground for dismissal of the information or reversal of a conviction if the error did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice. CrR 2.1(a)(1); *State v. Borrero*, 97 Wn. App. 101, 107 & n.21, 982 P.2d 1187 (1999), (citing *State v. Vangerpen*, 125 Wn.2d 782, 787-88, 888 P.2d 1177 (1995)), *adhered to on remand*, noted at 103 Wn. App. 1045 (2000).

2. Mr. Herndon does not demonstrate that his guilty plea statement "amounts to nothing other than an admission to fourth degree assault."

Mr. Herndon's remaining challenge to the factual basis for his plea is that his handwritten statement of the facts "amounts to nothing other than an admission to fourth degree assault." Br. of Appellant at 10.

"A person is guilty of assault in the fourth degree if, under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first, second, or third degree, or custodial assault, he or she assaults another." RCW 9A.36.041(1). To repeat, assault in the second degree under

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RCW 9A.36.021(1)(e) is committed when a person, in circumstances not amounting to assault in the first degree, “[w]ith intent to commit a felony, assaults another.” Of note, Mr. Herndon’s agreed criminal history reveals that before pleading guilty in this case, he had been convicted of both second and fourth degree assault: he was convicted of second degree assault in 2008, and fourth degree assault in 2012 and 2013.

Again, Mr. Herndon’s handwritten statement of the facts that made him guilty was, “On June 1, 2021, in Adams County, Washington, while I intended to commit a felony theft, I assaulted a family or household member.” CP at 61. Since that statement amounts to second degree assault, it could not constitute a fourth degree assault.

Mr. Herndon argues, however, that “[e]ven though the . . . statement references . . . an attempt to commit theft, the degree of theft is not identified. Therefore, it does not fit within the parameters of second-degree assault . . .” Br. of Appellant at 11. Yet, as the State points out, Mr. Herndon’s statement does more than speak of an intent to commit theft, it speaks of “intend[ing] to commit a *felony theft*.” CP at 61 (emphasis added). The guilty plea statement was not required to identify the degree of felony theft. Br. of Resp’t at 24 (citing *In re Pers. Restraint of Ness*, 70 Wn. App. 817, 821, 855 P.2d 1191 (1993) (citing, in turn, *In re Pers. Restraint of Hews*, 108 Wn.2d 579, 596, 741 P.2d 983 (1987) (“The constitution does not require that a defendant admit to every element of the charged crime in order to enter a valid guilty plea, but necessitates merely that the

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defendant understand the critical elements of the crime and admit to conduct which satisfies those elements.”)), *abrogated on other grounds by State v. Buckman*, 190 Wn.2d 51, 60-61, 409 P.3d 193 (2018)).

Mr. Herndon admits that his guilty plea statement was not required to identify a specific felony. Reply Br. at 9. He argues, however, that “if the matter had proceeded to trial” the State would have been required to establish his intent to commit a felony degree of theft (first or second degree theft), since third degree theft is a gross misdemeanor. Br. of Appellant at 9-10. This is a non sequitur. In accepting the plea, the trial court was not conducting a trial. *Cf., State v. Saas*, 118 Wn.2d 37, 43, 820 P.2d 505 (1991) (“In determining whether a factual basis exists for a plea, the trial court need not be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is in fact guilty.”).

Mr. Herndon concludes the argument in his opening brief by identifying “two cases that discuss situations similar to his case”: *State v. Zumwalt*, 79 Wn. App. 124, 901 P.2d 319 (1995), and *State v. Arnold*, 81 Wn. App. 379, 914 P.2d 762 (1996). Br. of Appellant at 15. *Zumwalt* addresses the proposition that a guilty plea statement may not simply parrot the information with conclusions of law. Emblematic of the problem with mere conclusions of law are *Zumwalt* and *State v. Powell*, 29 Wn. App. 163, 627 P.2d 1337 (1981). In *Zumwalt*, the court held that statements that *Zumwalt* was “armed with a deadly weapon” and was guilty of the “deadly<sup>27</sup> weapon enhancement” were legal

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*State v. Herndon*

conclusions and lacked content that would establish a factual basis for accepting a plea to the enhancement. 79 Wn. App. at 130-31. In *Powell*, the defendant's handwritten statement, "I did participate in the 1 [degree] murder of Charles Allison" could not fulfill the factual basis requirement of CrR 4.2(d). 29 Wn. App. at 167 (alteration in original). *Arnold*, the other case cited by Mr. Herndon, is entirely unhelpful. Mr. Herndon cites to only dicta that describes a general need to scrutinize plea statements, in a case where this court found an adequate basis for Arnold's plea. 81 Wn. App. at 384-85.

While a guilty plea statement must amount to more than a legal conclusion, the mere fact that it employs legal words of art is not disqualifying; what matters is that the court is satisfied that it evinces the defendant's understanding of the relationship between the law and the underlying facts. *State v. Heaps*, 36 Wn. App. 718, 725, 677 P.2d 1141 (1984). In *Heaps*, the guilty plea statement was that at a particular date and place, defendant did "willfully and unlawfully fraudulently make, alter and forge a check." *See id.* This court held that the trial court could reasonably find those to be common terms within a layman's understanding.

Here, Mr. Herndon had an agreed criminal history comprising past convictions of 7 felonies and 17 misdemeanors, so the trial court could reasonably view him as someone with an understanding of the distinction between <sup>28</sup>felonies and lesser crimes. And



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Mr. Herndon's criminal history included a conviction of third degree theft, the only nonfelonious degree of theft, so he was aware of the low dollar value threshold that would prevent a theft from being a felony.

Mr. Herndon fails to demonstrate that the trial court was not presented with a factual basis for his plea.

#### STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS

In a pro se statement of additional grounds, Mr. Herndon states that he relied on information that the victim had agreed to the mental health sentencing alternative, that he was aware the statute requires the court to consider the victim's wishes, and "therefore, I agreed to the plea agreement." SAG at 1. He does not identify the relief he is seeking, but presumably he seeks to withdraw his guilty plea. The court may allow a defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty whenever it appears necessary to correct a manifest injustice. CrR 4.2(f).

Due process requires a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea. *Boykin v. Alabama*, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969); *In re Pers. Restraint of Isadore*, 151 Wn.2d 294, 297, 88 P.3d 390 (2004). A defendant may challenge the voluntariness of a plea based on misinformation about a direct sentencing consequence. *State v. Weyrich*, 163 Wn.2d 554, 557, 182 P.3d 965 (2008). In *In re Personal Restraint of Fonseca*, 132 Wn. App. 464, 469, 132 P.3d 154 (2006), this

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*State v. Herndon*

court held that where the parties to a plea agreement were mutually mistaken about the defendant's possible eligibility for a drug offender sentencing alternative-- being unaware that some prior burglary convictions made him ineligible --the mistake concerned a direct sentencing consequence. And this was so even though Fonseca was aware that there was also an immigration impediment to his eligibility, although that was a problem he might have been able to resolve. *Id.* The court likened Fonseca's circumstances to those in *State v. Kissee*, 88 Wn. App. 817, 822, 947 P.2d 262 (1997), in which the court held that Kissee's misunderstanding that he was eligible for a special sex offender sentencing alternative was a direct sentencing consequence. As observed by this court, Kissee's mistaken belief in his eligibility (a belief shared by the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the trial judge) would produce a definite, immediate and automatic effect on his range of punishment. *Id.*

Here, Mr. Herndon's knowledge that the prosecutor would recommend the sentencing alternative and his belief that the victim would support it presented him with a favorable prospect for a lower range of punishment. The withdrawal of the victim's support did not render Mr. Herndon *ineligible* for the sentencing alternative, but it certainly diminished his prospects that it would be imposed.

We need not decide whether the misunderstanding was enough to render Mr. Herndon's guilty plea involuntary, because case law<sup>30</sup> holds that by not moving to

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*State v. Jerndon*

withdraw his plea when the victim's true position came to light, he has waived the right to withdraw it.

A motion to withdraw a plea can be made after judgment, in which case it is governed by CrR 7.8. CrR 4.2(f). In *State v. Mendoza*, 157 Wn.2d 582, 592, 141 P.3d 49 (2006), however, our Supreme Court held that the defendant in that case waived the right to challenge his plea where he was informed of a miscalculation of his offender score before sentencing and did not seize the opportunity to move to vacate the plea at that time. In *State v. Blanks*, 139 Wn. App. 543, 550, 161 P.3d 455 (2007), *review denied*, 163 Wn.2d 1046 (2008), the defendant, trying to distinguish *Mendoza*, argued that he should not be deemed to have waived his right to challenge a plea where sentencing immediately followed entry of his plea. He argued he was not given enough time to withdraw his plea. This court disagreed, observing that "*Mendoza* requires only the 'opportunity to withdraw the plea,' not a waiting period." *Id.* at 550 (citing *Mendoza*, 157 Wn.2d at 591).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> To the same effect, see *State v. Barnes*, Nos. 71144-0-I, 71145-8-I, slip op. at 6 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2014) (unpublished), <https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/index.cfm?fa=opinions.showOpinion&filename=711440MAJ> (After learning that the term of community custody had been misrepresented, "both [Barnes] and his attorney had an opportunity to address the court. Either could have asked the court to allow Barnes to withdraw his plea . . . but neither did so.").


The decision has no precedential value, is not binding on any court and is cited only for such persuasive value as its adherence to *Blanks* supports. See GR 14.1.

No. 38533-7-III  
*State v. Herndon*


Here, the victim's disapproval of the sentencing alternative was raised at the virtual inception of the sentencing. Both defense counsel and Mr. Herndon addressed the court thereafter. Rather than request leave to withdraw Mr. Herndon's guilty plea, both continued to advocate for the sentencing alternative. Under *Mendoza* and *Blanks*, the option of withdrawing the plea on account of the misunderstanding was waived.


Affirmed.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.

  
Siddoway, C.J.

WE CONCUR:

  
Fearing, J.

  
Pennell, J.

## APPENDIX “B”

ADAMS COUNTY  
FILED



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PAULETTE TESKE, Clerk  
BY AV

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON  
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS

STATE OF WASHINGTON,	)	NO. 21-1-00053-01
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	INFORMATION FOR:
	)	
v.	)	COUNT I: ASSAULT IN THE SECOND
	)	DEGREE - DOMESTIC
LLOYD EDWIN HERNDON, II	)	VIOLENCE
DOB: 03-12-85	)	RCW 9A.36.021(1)(e)
SEX: M	)	RCW 26.50.010(3)(a)
ADDRESS: 3331 36 <sup>TH</sup> Ave. S	)	
Seattle, WA 98144	)	
Defendant.	)	

COMES NOW K. PETER PALUBICKI, Chief Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Adams County, State of Washington, and by this information charges LLOYD EDWIN HERNDON with the crime of ONE COUNT OF ASSAULT IN THE SECOND DEGREE - DOMESTIC VIOLENCE in Adams County, Washington, as follows:

COUNT I: ASSAULT IN THE SECOND DEGREE-DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

On or about the 1st day of June, 2021, in the County of Adams, State of Washington, the above-named Defendant, with intent to commit a felony, did assault another person, to-wit: Racheal Anne Herington; contrary to Revised Code of Washington 9A.36.021 (1)(c); and furthermore do accuse the above-named defendant, Lloyd Edwin Herndon, II, that at said time of committing the above crime it was against an intimate partner as defined in RCW 26.50.010(7), which is a crime of domestic violence, as defined in RCW 10.99.020, contrary to Revised Code of Washington 26.50.010(3)(a).

INFORMATION

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Page 1 of 2

ADAMS COUNTY  
Prosecuting Attorney  
210 W Broadway  
Ritzville, WA 99133  
509-859-3219

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**ASSAULT IN THE SECOND DEGREE-DOMESTIC VIOLENCE** is a Class B Felony, punishable by confinement in a state correctional institution for a maximum term of ten (10) years, or by a fine in the amount of \$20,000.00, or by both such confinement and fine on each count.

DATED this 3<sup>rd</sup> day of JUNE, 2021.

*K. Peter Palubicki*  
K. PETER PALUBICKI, WSBA #41685  
CHIEF DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

STATE OF WASHINGTON )  
County of Adams ) §

K. PETER PALUBICKI, being first duly sworn, on oath deposes and says:

That he is a duly appointed Chief Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in and for said County and State; that he has read the foregoing Information, knows the contents thereof and believes the same to be true.


*K. Peter Palubicki*  
K. PETER PALUBICKI, WSBA #41685

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3 day of JUNE, 2021

PAULETTE J. TESKE

CLERK

*Ashley Vinnes*  
DEPUTY CLERK



INFORMATION

ADAMS COUNTY  
Prosecuting Attorney  
210 W Broadway  
Ritzville, WA 99169  
509-659-3219

## APPENDIX “C”



FILED  
Court of Appeals  
Division III  
State of Washington  
2/7/2022 3:14 PM

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON  
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAMS

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

LLOYD EDWIN HERDON, II

Defendant.

}  
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}  
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}  
}

NO. 21-1-00053-01

AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE

(ADPC)

AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE  
CAUSE

ADAMS COUNTY  
Prosecuting Attorney  
210 W Broadway  
Ritzville, WA 99169  
509-659-3219

**RECEIVED**  
**JUN 2 2021**  
**SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR ADAMS COUNTY**  
**ADAMS CO. PROBATION DEPARTMENT**  
**RITZVILLE STATION**  
**PRELIMINARY FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE**

STATE OF WASHINGTON )  
 ) SS  
 COUNTY OF ADAMS )

NO. 21-A01531

COMES NOW Hunter Klewin, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, AND STATES THAT THE FOLLOWING PERSON WAS ARRESTED BY THIS OFFICER AT THE FOLLOWING TIME AND PLACE:

NAME	HERNDON, LLOYD E.	DOB	3/12/1985	SEX	M	RACE	B
INCIDENT #	21-A01531	DATE	6/01/21	TIME	1449	PLACE	WB SHRAG REST AREA I-90

**LISTED BOOKING CHARGES:**

1. RCW 9A.36.021.1 ASSAULT 2<sup>ND</sup> DEGREE DV (VICTIM: HENNINGTON, RACHEAL A. 06/07/1982)
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_
4. \_\_\_\_\_

**THE ABOVE INDIVIDUAL WAS ARRESTED FOR THE LISTED CHARGES BASED UPON THE FOLLOWING FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES: (DESCRIBE BRIEFLY)**

On 6/01/21 at approximately 1449 hours, dispatch advised of a domestic assault at the west bound Shrag rest area in Adams County WA. The complainant, Scott Pena, observed the suspect striking a female victim in a parked car. Pena observed the vehicle leaving the rest area and continuing west bound on I-90. Pena followed the vehicle as it entered Grant County.

I responded from the Ritzville area.

I contacted Washington State Troopers who had stopped the vehicle on I-90 near milepost 181. I was advised the suspect, Lloyd Herndon, was handcuffed in the backseat of a Trooper's patrol vehicle. I contacted the victim, Racheal Henington, in her vehicle.

Henington told me she was in a dating relationship with Herndon. They were driving to the Westside of Washington State from Ohio.

Henington said she was in argument with Herndon. Herndon struck her several times with a closed fist while she was in the driver's seat and he was outside the vehicle. Herndon entered the vehicle and placed his hands around her neck and squeezed. Henington said she was unable to breathe when Herndon had his hands on her neck. Henington said this happened two times.

When Henington left the rest area she noticed a white work truck following her. The truck following her was Pena.

I CERTIFY (OR DECLARE) UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.

SIGNATURE

*[Handwritten Signature]*

DATE AND PLACE

6/01/21 RITZVILLE WA

**SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR ADAMS COUNTY**

**STATEMENT OF ARRESTING OFFICER AND  
PRELIMINARY FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE**

I observed red abrasions on both sides of Henington's neck. There was a lump forming under her hair from where she was struck by Herndon.

Henington completed a written statement on the side of the road. Henington gave me her phone number to follow up with a more detailed statement later.

I transferred Herndon from the Trooper's patrol vehicle to my patrol vehicle. I advised Herndon of his Constitutional Rights from my department issued card. Herndon said he already said what he had to say, and it wouldn't make a difference anyway. I advised Herndon he was under arrest for assault 2nd degree domestic violence.

Herndon was booked into the Adams County Jail.

I contacted Scott Pena by phone. Pena confirmed he saw Herndon strike Henington with a closed fist in "haymaker" type blows. Pena Herndon struck Henington three times. Pena saw Herndon place his hands on Henington, but at the distance he was he could not tell what was happening.

OFFICER RECOMMENDATION			
BAIL (AMOUNT):		PR:	
GANG AFFILIATED	YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>	

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I CERTIFY (OR DECLARE) UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.

*[Signature]*  
SIGNATURE

6/21/21 RITZVILLE WA  
DATE AND PLACE

## APPENDIX “D”

**WPIC 35.11**

**CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL SECURITY**

**WPIC 35.11**

**ASSAULT—SECOND DEGREE—WITH INTENT TO  
COMMIT FELONY—ELEMENTS**

To convict the defendant of the crime of assault in the second degree, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

- (1) That on or about (date), the defendant assaulted (name of person);
- (2) That the assault was committed with intent to commit (name of felony); and
- (3) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.

If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty.

On the other hand, if after weighing all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt as to any one of these elements, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.

**NOTE ON USE**

Fill in the name of the applicable felony or felonies.

Along with this instruction, use WPIC 10.01 (Intent—Intentionally—Definition), WPIC 35.50 (Assault—Definition), and WPIC 2.09 (Felony—Designation of), and an instruction defining the particular felony.

For a discussion of the phrase "this act" in the jurisdictional element, see WPIC 4.20 (Introduction) and the Note on Use to WPIC 4.21 (Elements of the Crime—Form).

**COMMENT**

RCW 9A.36.021(1)(e).

An assault in the second degree is a Class B felony unless the jury returns a special verdict finding that the crime was committed with sexual motivation. RCW 9A.36.021(2) (applies only to offenses occurring

## APPENDIX “E”

WPIC 35.16

**ASSAULT—SECOND DEGREE (ALTERNATE  
MEANS)—WITH DEADLY WEAPON OR WITH  
INTENT TO COMMIT FELONY—ELEMENTS**

To convict the defendant of the crime of assault in the second degree, each of the following two elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

- (1) That on or about (date), the defendant assaulted (name of person)
  - [(a) with a deadly weapon;] [or]
  - [(b) with intent to commit (name of felony)];] and
- (2) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.

If you find from the evidence that element (2) and either alternative element (1)(a) or (1)(b) have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty. To return a verdict of guilty, the jury need not be unanimous as to which of alternatives (1)(a) or (1)(b) has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as long as each juror finds that either (1)(a) or (1)(b) has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

On the other hand, if, after weighing all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt as to either element (1) or (2), then it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.

NOTE ON USE

The instruction is drafted for cases in which the jury needs to be instructed using two or more of the alternatives for element (1). Care must be taken to limit the alternatives to those that were included in the charging document and are supported by sufficient evidence. For directions on when and how to draft instructions with alternative elements, see WPIC 4.20 (Introduction) and the Note on Use and Comment to WPIC 4.23 (Elements of the Crime—Alternative Elements—Alternative Means for Committing a Single Offense—Form). For the related special verdict form, see WPIC 190.09 (Special Verdict Form—Elements with Alternatives). For any case in which substantial evidence supports only one of the alternatives in element (1), revise the

**WPIC 35.16**

**CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL SECURITY**

AB:

instruction to remove references to alternative elements, following the format set forth in WPIC 4.21 (Elements of the Crime—Form).

Along with this instruction, use as applicable WPIC 10.01 (Intent—Intentionally—Definition), WPIC 2.06 (Deadly Weapon—Definition as Element—Firearm or Explosive) or WPIC 2.06.01 (Deadly Weapon—Definition as Element—Weapons Other than Firearms and Explosives), WPIC 35.50 (Assault—Definition), and WPIC 2.09 (Felony—Designation of).

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For a discussion of the phrase “this act” in the jurisdictional element, see WPIC 4.20 (Introduction) and the Note on Use to WPIC 4.21 (Elements of the Crime—Form).

**COMMENT**

RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c) and (e).

See the Comment to WPIC 35.11 (Assault—Second Degree—With Intent to Commit Felony—Elements) for a general discussion of second degree assault.

For a discussion of offenses involving alternative means, see WPIC 4.20 (Introduction) and the Note on Use and Comment to WPIC 4.23 (Elements of the Crime—Alternative Elements—Alternative Means for Committing a Single Offense—Form).

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**NO. 38533-7-III**

**COURT OF APPEALS**

**DIVISION III**

**STATE OF WASHINGTON**

STATE OF WASHINGTON,	)	
	)	ADAMS COUNTY
Plaintiff,	)	NO. 21-1-00053-0
Respondent,	)	
	)	<b>CERTIFICATE</b>
v.	)	<b>OF SERVICE</b>
	)	
LLOYD EDWIN HERNDON II,	)	
	)	
Defendant,	)	
Appellant.	)	
_____	)	

I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that on this 24th day of February, 2023, I caused a true and correct copy of the *PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW* to be served on:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION III      E-FILE  
Attn: Tristen Worthen, Clerk  
500 N Cedar St  
Spokane, WA 99201

Adams County Prosecutor's Office      E-FILE  
Randy J. Flyckt  
[randyf@co.adams.wa.us](mailto:randyf@co.adams.wa.us)

LLOYD EDWIN HERNDON II #315379      U.S. MAIL  
Stafford Creek Correction Center  
191 Constantine Way  
Aberdeen, WA 98520

s/ Dennis W. Morgan  
DENNIS W. MORGAN      WSBA #5286  
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant.  
P.O. Box 1019  
Republic, WA 99169  
Phone: (509) 775-0777  
Fax: (509) 775-0776  
[nodblspk@rcabletv.com](mailto:nodblspk@rcabletv.com)

**February 24, 2023 - 9:33 AM**

**Transmittal Information**

**Filed with Court:** Court of Appeals Division III  
**Appellate Court Case Number:** 38533-7  
**Appellate Court Case Title:** State of Washington v. Lloyd Edwin Herndon, II  
**Superior Court Case Number:** 21-1-00053-0

**The following documents have been uploaded:**

- 385337\_Petition\_for\_Review\_20230224093139D3409034\_3973.pdf  
This File Contains:  
Petition for Review  
*The Original File Name was Herndon PDR.pdf*

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- RobertL@co.Adams.wa.us
- randyf@co.adams.wa.us

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